A Critique of the Dutch Government’s Position on Iran

By the International Federation of Iranian Refugees (IFIR)

November 1997


 

Introduction

Sources Used

1. General Situation

1.3 Nature of Government

1.4 Recent Political Developments/Elections

1.5 Political Parties/Activities

1.6 Demonstrations

1.7 Legal System/Judicial Process

1.7.1 Police Forces
1.7.2. Legal System
1.7.3. Judicial Process
1.7.4. Penal Code
1.7.5. Prisons

2. Human Rights Violations

2.1. General

2.2. Integrity of Person

2.2.1. Death Penalty
2.2.2. Stoning
2.2.3. Corporal Punishment and Mutilation
2.2.4. Torture

2.3. Civil Rights/Freedom of Opinion

2.4. Religious Minorities

2.5. Position of Women

2.5.1. Family Law
2.5.2. Divorce
2.5.3 Guardianship/Custody
2.5.4. Child Marriages

2.6. Infringement of the Code of Dress and Behavior

2.7. Position of Homosexuals

3. Departure Procedures at the Airport

4. Repatriation

Conclusion


 

Introduction

The Islamic regime continues to unabatedly violate human rights for maintenance of state power. Countless reports from a wide range of sources indicate that no significant changes towards greater human rights have occurred since the Islamic regime took power.

In 1997 alone, news of several atrocities reverberated in the media outside Iran, despite an environment of repression and censorship. Early this year in Tehran, oil workers struggling for the rights to organize and reach collective agreements were attacked, arrested and tortured, and several of their leaders were killed. In April 1997, a German court’s verdict regarding the Mykonos assassination of three political opponents formally exposed the Islamic regime’s coordinated policy to kill Iranian dissidents. In May 1997, hundreds of political prisoners went on hunger-strike to protest intolerable prison conditions; a number of them died as a result of the hunger-strike or were executed. In August 1997, the latest victim of the regime’s state-sponsored system of gender-apartheid was stoned after being accused of engaging in voluntary sexual relations.

This briefing strongly opposes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) June 5, 1997 report on the general situation in Iran; confirms that the atrocities committed by the Islamic regime continue unabated; and rejects the decision that Iranian asylum seekers can be "safely" deported to Iran.

 

Sources Used

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) report on Iran is inconsistent with its own sources including all official general reports (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices), and previous reports by the United Nations Special Representative for Human Rights in Iran. Furthermore, it contradicts first-hand information gathered by IFIRIC from thousands of Iranian refugees and asylum seekers, which corroborates reports of persecution, arrest, imprisonment and torture.

The reports which most support the Ministry’s position are those by Maurice Copithorne, the UN Special Representative for Iran, and sources within Iran. Reports obtained from the Islamic regime itself are obviously biased and unreliable. Copithorne’s reports contrast sharply with those written by his predecessor, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl. During his tenure, Galindo Pohl stated that the Iranian authorities prevented him from meeting with specific prisoners he had requested to see and that prisoner he had met during an earlier visit had been singled out for particularly severe punishment because he complained to the special representative about torture. On the other hand, Copithorne states that he felt that the Iranian government wanted to cooperate with his inquiries into the human rights situation and that he had no sense that Iranian officials had prevented people from seeing him. Galindo Pohl resigned

as the Commission’s Special Representative on Iran after being denied permission to visit Iran for several years due to his candid reporting of the human rights situation in Iran (Reuters, April 1, 1996).

Given that the special representative’s access to Iran is by the invitation of the regime, Copithorne has ignored the ample evidence of systematic and gross human rights violations in order to facilitate access to Iran. By relying primarily on Copithorne’s reports, the Dutch government acts similarly to the special representative. It appears that the MFA’s report on Iran contradicts or ignores the overwhelming evidence available on eighteen years of cruelty and terror in Iran in order to secure better political and economic ties with the Iranian government.

 

1. General Situation

1.3 Nature of Government

Iran is a theocratic republic based on Islamic legislation... Islamic principles take precedence over all laws and regulations, even over constitutional provisions... Although there has since ceased to be any active internal opposition or any real threat to the regime’s authority, those in power remain apprehensive of any seemingly serious threat...There are no political parties in the western sense. It is, however, possible to discern three main schools of thought.

 

1.4 Recent Political Developments/Elections

The MFA report states that the secular opposition in particular has been silenced as a result of severe repression in the early years. "Recent years have seen a limited dose of democracy slowly brought into the system, with parliament playing an increasingly prominent role." "Prominent members of the present government and of the majlis are university-educated in the USA." Mention is made of the increase in women in parliament.

 

1.5 Political Parties/Activities

"Political activities, including distribution of leaflets, and participation in unauthorized gatherings, by illegal opposition groups ... do not seem to give rise to repression, where they do take place." Only people suspected of having links with the Mujahedin-e-Khalq can "expect heavy prison sentences." "When the authorities have reason to believe prohibited material to be present, premises may be searched. The mere possession and distribution of prohibited materials... in practice incurs a fine at most."

 

1.6 Demonstrations

"Demonstrations still take place from time to time in various parts of the country, mainly as a result of

adverse social and economic situation." It mentions the 1996 clashes in the northwest of the country

against which the authorities took "tough action." "Two people were killed in the process."

 

1.7 Legal System/Judicial Process

1.7.1 Police Forces

Section 1.7.1. states that Islamic Revolutionary Committees are a law-and-order force responsible for "security, maintaining public order and protecting the achievements of the revolution" as well as combating drug trafficking. It goes on to say that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards "is not an intelligence service, but does in part have responsibility for security tasks." Its primary tasks consist of "protecting the revolution against internal and external enemies by means of a small elite corps with strong ideological convictions." Since the Baseej volunteer corps joined it in 1983, the Guard has "expanded to become a major military organization."

 

1.7.2. Legal System

"Under Article 57 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, legislative, judicial and executive powers are formally separate... The head of the judiciary is responsible for the appointment of prosecutors and the chief justice of the supreme court." "The present legal system distinguishes between two kinds of courts, ordinary and special ones. The ordinary courts are subdivided into criminal and civil courts. The main special courts are the special civil courts and the revolutionary courts... The revolutionary courts are subdivided into three sections: one for economic offenses, one for political offenses, and one for special crimes, including drug offenses and smuggling." "Iran has a bar association... Although the association is in law an independent institution, the authorities in practice exert some control over it... Reports that lawyers acting before revolutionary courts face intimidation cannot be confirmed." "Constitutionally, no arrest can be made without a valid warrant for the purpose. Lawyers even those involved in the proceedings before revolutionary courts, have access to their clients in detention. The law does not proscribe any time following arrest within which the case has to be brought to court. In minor criminal cases, charges have to be brought within two months; in more serious cases, the time limit is four months. The time limit is not always observed either on account of the court’s heavy workload or because preliminary inquiries by the revolutionary and public prosecutors could not be completed in time."

 

1.7.3. Judicial Process

"..The judicial process has improved in recent years... greater legal safeguards for the accused can now in general be said to be in place, even before the revolutionary courts. Defendants have a constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer at all court hearings and facilities are provided for this." The report quotes Copithorne’s report stating that "the Iranian authorities have applied to the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights/Center for Human Rights and the Criminal Justice Branch at the UN for technical assistance in training magistrates and in improving the prison system." "In a very large number of cases heard by the revolutionary courts, appeals are in fact lodged. However, only a small percentage result in the initial judgment being overturned." The Amnesty International Report 1997: Iran, states: As in previous years, political trials fell far short of international fair trial standards (see previous Amnesty International Reports). Trial hearings were often held in camera and, despite official assurances to the contrary, detainees were still reportedly often denied access to legal counsel. "Extortion of confessions is not permitted by law; confessions are legally valid only if made in court."

 

1.7.4. Penal Code

"The imposition of the death penalty for endangering the security of the Islamic Republic is possible in a limited number of cases in which the culprit is regarded as a mohareb (an enemy of God).

 

1.7.5. Prisons

"As almost everywhere in the third world, facilities in Iranian prisons do not come up to western standards. Hygiene conditions can on the whole nevertheless be described as reasonable." The footnote to this section adds that "the UN Special Representative for human rights sums up his talks with a number of prisoners from Evin prison as follows: ‘The prisoners stated that the situation in Evin and the treatment of prisoners had improved somewhat over the past two years. Food was in general terms good, although insufficient in proteins and calories. The prisoners could buy additional food. Medical care was, in general terms, also adequate. The prison had a central library and the relatives could provide the prisoners with books, although they must be approved by prison authorities and were restricted in the range of subjects. They also stated they could have family visits once a week.’ A footnote adds that "see, however, the belief of, among others, Amnesty International (Iran: official secrecy hides continuing repression) that political opponents are too often prosecuted on charges of ordinary criminal offenses e.g. drug smuggling. The UN Special Representative for human rights ‘has reason to believe that too often critics of the status quo are denounced and in some cases imprisoned under charges of common criminal conduct or of disloyalty to Islam or the State... Inquiries cannot come up with any definite answer as to the truth of this belief.’ " The report adds that "Moreover, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that, for instance, MKO [Mujahedin-e-Khalq] members also in fact

 

engage in drug smuggling." "How many political prisoners are (still) being held is unclear." The footnote adds that the "UN Special Representative for human rights notes that ‘There are widespread allegations that there remain at least some prisoners of conscience in Iranian jails.’ "

 

2. Human Rights Violations

2.1. General

"The human rights situation in Iran continues to give cause for concern...As the regime has consolidated its position, such human rights violations have gradually decreased. As far as is known, there have not in recent times been any political trials."

 

2.2. Integrity of Person

2.2.1. Death Penalty

"In 1996 at least 50 death sentences were carried out, 15 of them in public. At least one person was stoned to death. The first eight months of 1996 saw 66 executions. The death penalty was also carried out by means of public hangings in 1996... In addition to the cases mentioned in 1.7.4. above, the death penalty may also be imposed for various other offenses, including the spreading of corruption on earth (mofsed), murder, armed robbery, abduction, rape, adultery or incest, sexual intercourse obtained by a non-Muslim man and a Muslim woman, sodomy, drug smuggling and the use of arms to spread fear or alarm among the people or deprive them of their freedom or security."


2.2.2. Stoning

"As at least four witnesses are required in order to prosecute for adultery, there are not in practice any actual prosecutions brought. We are not aware of any cases of stoning to death for adultery."

 


2.2.3. Corporal Punishment and Mutilation

"The Islamic penal code also makes provisions for corporal punishment. This mainly involves flogging and amputation. Under Sharia law, there are 27 conditions to be fulfilled before such punishment can be imposed. In particular crimes are required to have been committed by repeat offenders and to be directed against the poor."

 

2.2.4. Torture

"There are reliable reports that torture is still practiced by the security forces. Detainees and prisoners risk being subjected to torture, despite the fact this is prohibited by Article 38 of the constitution."

 

2.3. Civil Rights/Freedom of Opinion

"..Intellectuals suspected by the regime of disloyalty, including independent writers and journalists, have found themselves under increasing pressure... the press can nevertheless be said to be reasonably pluralist... Criticism is accepted to some extent provided it does not give rise to any doubt as to loyalty to the principles of the Islamic revolution."

 

2.4. Religious Minorities

"[Strict compliance with Islamic values] ... involves discrimination against religious minorities. The position of Baha’is is cause for concern... Iran allows freedom of witness for the three officially recognized religious minorities: Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. For some while, though, pressure has been mounting on Christian communities and individuals suspected of proselytizing. There are reports of prosecution, threatening and intimidation of people actively converting Muslims. Apostasy from Islam is punishable by death under Sharia law. However, the penal code does not include any penal provision on this point. Nor are there any known cases of the death penalty actually being imposed on that count. In practice, though, Muslims who have converted to Christianity and who openly display their religious beliefs can expect to face serious repression. Reports have been received of members of the Baha’i faith being detained for and convicted of apostasy, sometimes together with other charges. There is said to be twelve Baha’is currently in prison for this."

 

2.5. Position of Women

"As the Special Representative for human rights states: "While the legal and practical disabilities faced by women in Iran have been well documented, it is now clear that some change has been effected in recent years and that there are a number of signs that further and substantive improvements may be on the way."

"Women have played an important role in the revolution and can derive considerable self-confidence from this."

"The presence of women is more visible on the streets and at places of entertainment than in surrounding Islamic countries. "

"While the dress code is mandatory, there are hardly any women voluntarily covering their face with a veil or wearing the traditional burqah to be seen on the streets in Iran, unlike Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia. In cities such as Tehran and Isfahan, visibly displaying part of the hair is in practice tolerated."

"For instance, the number of women in education has increased considerably since the early years of the revolution."

"According to information from the Iranian authorities, 342 women hold senior executive positions in the government sector and an estimated 300 women positions within the judiciary, including as examining magistrates and judges in family-law matters."

"There are also at present, 13 women members of parliament and one woman minister. The first lady mayor was recently appointed too, and 185 of the 2,661 lawyers practicing in Iran and 18% of journalists are women. There is at present a political debate going on, sparked off by President Rafsanjani’s daughter, Faezeh Hashemi, regarding women’s eligibility for the Presidency. Iran has a number of organizations for women, most of them governmental, including the Cultural and Social Council of Women."

 

2.5.1. Family Law

"In family-law matters, particularly in contracting marriages, the practice is not so much to apply the Civil

Code provisions as rather to follow those of the (officially repealed) Family Protection Act and agree on terms of marriage by means of notarial deeds. With the authorities’ support, volunteer schemes are currently being run in the countryside to inform women of their rights, particularly as regards matrimonial legislation, the right to work and the right to travel freely. "

 

2.5.2. Divorce

"As Sharia law places women at a disadvantage to men in matters of marriage and divorce, before getting married, women often have a number of points placed on record by a notary in order to strengthen their hand. While such stipulations are not allowed to conflict with applicable Islamic law, this
does mean that women are able to improve their position substantially in a number of respects."

"Divorces are also common in Iran. The ex-husband is required to continue to make provision for the maintenance of his ex-wife."

 

2.5.3 Guardianship/Custody

"This system [of child custody] stems from Sharia law and is applicable in most Islamic countries."

 

2.5.4. Child Marriages

"They (marriages to young girls) are regarded by the Islamic authorities as un-Islamic. In particular, the imposed nature of such marriages for girls is fundamentally rejected."

 

2.6. Infringement of the Code of Dress and Behavior

"Under Article 638 of the Islamic Penal Code, a woman who appears in public failing to observe the dress code is punishable by imprisonment from 10 days to 2 months or a fine...Other penalties such as flogging are not referred to in that Article."

2.7. Position of Homosexuals

"Homosexual behavior is prohibited in Iran. It carried the death penalty. As the burden of proof is considerable, at least four witnesses being required in order to prosecute, hardly any convictions for committing homosexual acts are in practice obtained. There is no active policy of prosecution."

 

3. Departure Procedures at the Airport

"It is virtually impossible for people wanted by the Iranian authorities to leave the country by that route under their own identity on a lawfully obtained passport, with or without the use of bribery."

 

4. Repatriation

"The Iranian authorities have stated on various occasions that all Iranians having left the country who have been involved in terrorist activities are free to return. Many Iranians living abroad who do not (or no longer) hold a valid national passport travel to Iran voluntarily, without any difficulty, on a laissez-passer issued by the Iranian representation abroad. Applying for asylum in another country is not regarded by the Iranian authorities as a political act and is not in itself a punishable offense. The authorities take the view that the vast majority of Iranian asylum seekers are trying to get away from the difficult economic and social situation. Since the last official report was issued, on 1 May 1996, a few dozen Iranian have been expelled to Iran, with their arrival at the airport in all cases being monitored by the Netherlands embassy. In most cases they were also subsequently visited at their home address (about three days after their arrival). None of the expelled Iranians experienced any difficulties with the authorities after repatriation on account of their stay in the Netherlands and having applied for asylum. Shortly after being admitted at the airport, one expelled Iranian was detained by the Iranian police for a few days. According to the person concerned, he was arrested in connection with an investigation into organized illegal migration, with the false visa in his passport prompting inquiries to be made. There were no problems during the identity check and, on his own admission, he was well-treated. He did, however, report having been maltreated at his first interrogation during the subsequent detention, said to have lasted for about ten days. After that he had no difficulties with the Iranian authorities. "Iranians entering on a laissez-passer may be detained for a few hours to one or two days in order to establish their identity.... Inquiries were made of a number of western countries regarding the policy on expulsion of finally rejected Iranian asylum seekers...None of these countries follows an en bloc approach barring expulsion of particular groups as a matter of policy or on account of judicial impediments. There is no reason to believe that the many Iranians who have returned to their country of origin from abroad have experienced any serious difficulties with the Iranian authorities."

 

Conclusion

"The situation in Iran has stabilized since the early years of the Islamic revolution. The regime has consolidated its position; repression has in general declined... There remain, however, identifiable classes of cases and particular circumstances in which Iranians are personally in danger of persecution... There is no let-up in the policy of repression directed against those considered to be counter-revolutionary, there is increasing pressure on independent writers and journalists suspected of disloyalty to the regime, and repression of religious minorities, in particular those engaging in proselytization, seems to be on the increase rather than declining. In spite of improvements, judicial process still falls short of international standards; despite the letter of the law, confessions are extracted under duress and court hearings held without the required presence of a lawyer. In view of the general situation in Iran, repatriation of Iranian asylum seekers not eligible for admission either as a refugee on such grounds or for humanitarian reasons cannot on the face of it be regarded as unreasonable. In this connection, I would expressly refer again to the position of draft evaders and deserters, even from the Iran-Iraq war. While punishable by law, they are also covered by an amnesty. In practice too, there is a buying out option, which is apparently being taken up."

IFIRIC declares its opposition to the Dutch government's violations of Iranian refugee rights and demands that the Dutch government cease the deportation of Iranian asylum seekers; re-instate the ban of deportations to Iran; cancel the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that effectively deems Iran a safe country to return asylum seekers; re-investigate the casefiles of all asylum seekers who have received deportation writs; and, recognize the right to asylum.

Undoubtedly, a similar situation in the Netherlands would be intolerable. The report is a clear example of how cultural relativism can be used to misrepresent a system of violent human rights abuses. By focusing on the public image "improvements" made by the regime, the Dutch government judges human rights by Islamic standards. Such rampant racism denies those living in Iran their humanity and ignores international standards. The regime uses the same approach stating that "western countries and human rights organizations cannot use their own...norms to evaluate all nations without considering their cultures, values, and intellectual foundations" (January 9, 1997 Reuters). Rather than portray the situation in Iran, the MFA report reveals the extent to which the Dutch government is willing to cooperate with the Islamic regime to promote their mutual interests.

To lend credence to the notion that real advances are possible under the rule of the Islamic regime is antithetical to human rights or to be ignorant of Islamic law. Anything short of the condemnation of the Islamic Republic of Iran amounts to condoning a state-sponsored system in which persecution and discrimination is legalized, institutionalized and brutally enforced.